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Comprehending the art of
cinema is an ability that can be fostered, as other cognitive
abilities can be fostered. After all, cinema viewers are
cognitively active while watching a film, constantly engaged in
figuring it out. Grasping a film does not differ in principle
from any other cognitive activity. At one end of the creation
process stands the artist who represents to herself various
aspects of the world, processes them in her mind while embodying
the processed representations in symbolic sets unique to the
various art fields. At the other end stands the viewer who tries
to decode the artwork symbols based on hypotheses that he raises
and which are based on flexible schemes he has in his
mind.
What differentiates art
and cinematic art from other fields is the aesthetic interest it
arouses i.e., interest in the design of the artwork materials.
From this aesthetic interest stems the cognitive development that
should be considered in educating to viewing the various
arts.
These hypotheses are the
essence of the developmental–cognitive approach described
in this article. The contribution of this approach to the theory
of cinema is in the assumption that it is possible to foster
aesthetic cognition and sensibility 1. This approach may
re-design the way and the nature of the education for viewing and
making cinema.
The
Developmental-Cognitive Approach
The cognitive approach
assumes the existence of an autonomous mentation layer in which
mental representations exist by means of symbols, schemes, images
etc. This activity enables human beings to represent in their
consciousness various aspects of the world (for instance with the
help of numbers), to mentally process these aspects, (meaning, to
multiply the numbers) and to embody the representations and their
processes in the unique symbolic systems of the various fields.
For example: (2X2 = 4). 2
The ability to perform
such an activity probably develops gradually although it is
possible that the basic abilities are innate.3 The psychologist Jean
Piaget, who laid down the foundations for the description of this
gradual process, held that from the moment of birth the human
being is engaged in examining his surroundings and aiming at
resolving problems. This is done in four phases:
- The Motor-Sensory phase in which the encounter with the world
is led by an action on objects.
- The Symbolic phase in which the objects are mentally
represented even in their absence.
- The Concrete Activity phase in which there is coordination
between mental representation and the world objects.
- The Formal Activity phase in which experience is mediated
through mental abstractions that can be processed without any
connection to the objects in the world, i.e. mathematical
formulas
A general characteristic
of this process is the gradual transition from a generalized and
boundless representation in which there is no distinction between
the part and the whole or their inter-relation (phases 1-2), to a
representation which enables increasing distinctions (phases
3-4). This transition is concurrent with the human being's
individuation process. According to this assumption, a person
gradually passes from the stage in which he grasps himself as an
undistinguished part of his surroundings to the gradual
recognition that he is separate and different from his fellow
people and his surroundings.
Researchers, who have
accepted the general model of the development described by
Piaget, found out that different abilities are required in
various fields, and therefore there are different emphases in the
stages of development. Furthermore, it seems that cognitive
development is not parallel in different fields. Gardner, who
reached the conclusion that there are various kinds of
intelligence each with unique phases of cognitive development,
developed this concept. That is why human beings develop
cognitively in a different way in different fields. Gardner
himself mentions seven kinds of intelligence, which require
different cognitive abilities (linguistic, musical,
logical-mathematical, spatial, physical-kinetic, inner-personal,
inter-personal.) Thus for example, spatial intelligence requires
a different ability, in respect of the ability to connect a part
to the whole, than linguistic intelligence5.
Different kinds of
intelligence, according to Gardner, lead to the development of
different mental representations and to specific mental
processes. Accordingly, the embodiment of specific
representations in the various media is made through the unique
symbolic systems of each one of these media.
The
Developmental-Cognitive Approach for Comprehending
Art
According to the
cognitive approach, an artistic activity does not differ, in
principle, from any other cognitive activity. The artist embodies
in his artistic work, which is comprehended as a symbolic system,
his mental representations and their processing. The perceiver of
the art, on the other hand, decodes the work of art as a symbolic
system, relying on hypotheses she raises, and which are based on
flexible schemes she has in her mind.
Artistic making and
perception differs from other cognitive activities by the unique
human interest in them, an interest from which the cognitive
development and the unique mental processing of the art are
derived. The assumption is that human beings are born with
aesthetic sensibility (meaning, a sensory, emotional and
cognitive sensibility for formal compositions and for the ways of
embodiment of emotion, thought or world representations). This
sensibility does indeed overlap other human cognitive activities,
such as acquiring scientific or practical knowledge, yet it is
autonomous and does not depend on them. Thus for example, facing
a painting of a horse, extra-artistic hypotheses will focus on
questions relating to the kind of animal (Is it a horse? What
kind of a horse is it?). However, artistic hypotheses will focus
on the horse’s design (the proportions between the parts,
the way and the direction of the brush strokes, the patterns of
color) and on the way of embodying emotion or significance
regarding the horse from the way it is designed (Does it express
passion? nobility? stupidity?).
Cognitivists like
Goodman, Gardner and others6 considered the essence of the cognitive
processing of the work of art in the building of a composition
which creates the context for the formal elements and the various
symbols, and in the metaphorization of these elements and
symbols. With the help of this process, which creates forms
called by Goodman “replete”, the work of art embodies
the emotion and the significance which the artist wants to convey
and the perceiver wants to comprehend.
Goodman illustrates what
he means by comparing the shape of an Electro-Cardiogram line
with the function of the same line in the context of an artistic
composition. In the first case the line is used to decode the
patient’s heart activity. In the hands of an artist that
same line becomes “replete”, meaning that its width,
direction and angles may embody the feeling of rage7.
The difference between
aesthetic and non-aesthetic interest has implications on the
fostering manners of artistic cognition. Thus for instance,
Gardner and others describe a child scribbling on a paper, as
someone practicing the development of a general ability for
conventional symbolic manipulation in the motor-sensual phase
indicated by Piaget. However, at the same time it seems that the
child finds aesthetic and sensual pleasure in this activity
itself, which promotes building a variety of aesthetic options of
visual representation.
A non-aesthetic
examination of the child’s scribbling on the paper will
grasp this activity as a prior and negligible stage of developing
accurate conventional symbolic representation (numbers, letters
etc). On the other hand, an aesthetic examination finds these
scribbles crucial in fostering aesthetic sensibility, a
sensibility that usually fades away once the ability for accurate
conventional symbolic representation is gained8.
The assumption that
artistic sensibility is autonomous and innate, and the
comprehension that there is a distinct artistic cognitive
development, led various researchers to examine what
distinguishes artistic cognitive development9.
Parsons10 showed that the
progressive comprehension of art overlaps general cognitive
progression in leading from a simple to a complex understanding
of the artistic medium and in that it entails a process of
individuation. However, he also showed that the aesthetic
interest of a person and her cognitive development in the context
of art have distinctive features.
Assisted by many empiric
testimonies Parsons showed that cognitive development in art is
distinct and comprises five successive main phases. Attention is
drawn to different emphases in each of these phases. From stage
to stage the comprehension of the artistic medium is gradually
deepened. His evidence also indicated that trying to foster
artistic comprehension by focusing in early stages upon emphases
pertaining to later stages usually does not interest the artist
or the art perceiver and its benefit is low.
Excluding the first
phase, the phases according to this approach are:
Emphasis on the adequacy of the representation: at this
phase children (or artistically underdeveloped adults)11 are
interested in issues relating to the adequacy of the work of art
to the image of reality they have in their minds. Questions
concerning the adequacy of the representation of reality lead
their judgement. Beautiful to them is what is close to the
prototype of the represented topic. This phase is concurrent with
general cognitive development in that it is possible to see in
the attempt to create a correlation between the representation
and the represented topic as an attempt to connect the part to
the whole.
Emphasis on the emotional expressiveness in a work of
art: at this phase attention is drawn to the emotional
aspects of the work of art. Perceivers identify the feelings
aroused in them with those of the creator. The adequacy of the
representation of “external” reality is replaced by
an “inner” emotional representation of reality. The
emotional identification with the creator parallels in children
the beginning of an awareness of the presence of the other.
Emphasis on the symbolic components, systemic modes of
expression, genres and traditions in the medium: this is a
phase in which artists and art perceivers are receptive regarding
learning about the medium's traditions. They look for similarity
between works of art, they are sensitive to the medium specific
forms of processing and locate with interest a common style
between works of art. This phase, which can also be called a
conventional phase, is concurrent with general cognitive
development because it is possible to see in the desire to learn
about artistic conventions a stage of socialization in which the
child internalizes society rules and aspires to act according to
them. It seems that in this phase a gap is created between the
making of art and its reception. Whereas the receiver shows much
knowledge about artistic conventions, the creator aspires to
imitate in a most schematic way these conventions12.
Emphasis on a reasoned judgement of the aesthetic aspects
of a work of art: at this high stage of familiarity with the
art medium, based on knowledge of its history, traditions and
conventions, the perceiver starts to judge the quality of the
work of art. This judgement is based on a deep comprehension of
the medium abilities and of self-awareness of the subjective
selectivity of judgement. This phase is concurrent with general
cognitive development in the way that here individuation is
expressed by self recognizing that while being part of society
you are distinguished from it.
The
Developmental-Cognitive Approach for Comprehending the Art of
Cinema
It seems that the
developmental cognitive process described by Parsons is common to
all arts. However, different arts mobilize different kinds of
intelligence, which require a different aesthetic
processing.
Thus, for example, the
aesthetic connection between the part and the whole requires
different cognitive abilities in a song, in a painting or in a
film. The song mobilizes linguistic “intelligence”;
the painting and the film require spatial intelligence13. The painting
is static and calls forth spatial intelligence, but the film
exists in motion and requires the mobilization of kinetic –
motional intelligence in addition to spatial intelligence.
Therefore, an artistic design requires the development of
different cognitive abilities for different arts in the framework
of the general process of artistic cognitive
development.
Cinema studies from
cognitive and other perspectives that stress what's unique to
cinema, e.g., the combining of moving taped images with a sound
track, have decoded different ways of cinema-specific aesthetic
processing. Among other things, they discussed camera movements
and editing formats that have been used to create moving
compositions of space, time, action, rhythm and metaphors within
the context of various film styles and genres14.
Thus, a cinematic shot
where the camera slowly moves to a Close Up of an object is
unique to the medium. Such a shot enables to create an intimate
relation between object and viewer. It may intensify emotion or
bring about the gradual dramatic and tense disclosure of an
event. On the other hand, that same process may enable
abstraction and symbolization of the cinematographed object, thus
enabling the embodiment of thought, because of the close-up
quality to cut off the object from its surroundings15. For example,
the gradual isolation of a raised fist, or a composition of a
series of close-ups of fists creates the abstraction and
symbolism whose significance might be “struggle” or
“uprising”16. Alternatively, the sequencing of various
close-ups of faces might create a metaphor of closeness or
suffocation due to “locking up” the faces within the
frame17.
Combining a close-up of a character's face with a threatening
sound track which reaches our ears from the space which
presumably surrounds the figure but is not visually present, can
arouse a tense feeling in us that the figure is afraid. Neither
the figure nor we know from where danger will emerge18.
Comprehending the art of
cinema requires focusing on the unique aesthetic processing of
this art. Nevertheless, this comprehension requires a
sectionalized, gradual and cumulative focus on these processes,
paying attention to the specific interest the perceiver has in
each phase in the developmental process of comprehending the
art.
According to Parsons,
this progression leads in a series of successive emphases, from a
simple to a complex understanding of the artistic medium.
Hereafter are some hypotheses on the fostering of this
progression in the field of cinema, focusing on the device of
Slow Motion, which is unique to this medium.
In the first acquaintance stage with the medium, a phase
in which attention is directed towards the adequacy of the
representation, Slow Motion can be examined according to its
success in revealing hidden qualities of the represented object.
Slow Motion can, for instance, slow down the race speed of a
runner of a hundred meters thus exposing the many movements of
the muscles operating while running, movements that cannot be
seen when we watch that same run on the field or see it shot in
regular speed.
In general, it seems
that in this initial acquaintance stage with the cinematic medium
viewers will be interested in the cinematic ability of
documentation, mainly in relating the representation to the
original as a relating process of the part to the whole. In the
context of part to whole relation, the viewers might find
interest in a discussion and illustration of how an image of a
whole event is composed from a sequence of shots offering
fragments of this event. It is possible that by deconstructing
and reconstructing cinematic continuity editing (periodic return
from fragments to establishing shots, eye-line match, cutting in
motion, etc) spatial and motional intelligence of viewers is
mobilized19 fostering their cinematic comprehension based
on the reality type artistic interest they have in this
stage.
In the second phase the emotional expressiveness of the
work of art is sought for. In this stage it is possible to
examine Slow Motion according to its ability to embody emotions
intensively and create intimacy with the represented event. It
seems that such an embodiment is effective thanks to the
qualities of slowing processes and the imaging of hovering in
space, characteristics of Slow Motion which we might find as
being concurrent with the spreading of emotion within ourselves.
The representation of the death of a well-liked figure by its
Slow Motion fall to the ground or the hovering-run of a figure as
a metaphor for happiness are examples of the embodiment of
emotion and of creating intimacy with characters.
It seems that at this
phase the viewers will be particularly interested in dramas and
films of horror, but also in “first person” cinema
which documents the creator’s experiences. The exposure of
the way emotional expression is composed through editing rhythm,
the use of close-ups, the relation between sound track and moving
image and so on, might neutralize direct emotional
identification. At the same time it might sharpen the cognitive
awareness of another person’s ability to embody emotions
and concepts through means which are unique to the cinematic
medium.
In the third stage, in which emphasis is on symbolic
components, systemic modes of expression, genres and traditions
in the medium, it is possible, for instance, to compare Slow
Motion as a cinematic time device, to the Close-Up as a parallel
spatial device (from the aspects of intensity, closeness and
abstraction from the course of events).
It seems that in this
stage cinema in general will interest the viewers, especially
distinct genre or style films, reflexive films (meaning such that
deal with cinema and cinematic process as subject), films that
emphasize inter-textual contexts, and avant-guarde films that try
to examine the limits of the medium. Decoding a genre or style,
illustrating inter-textual relations etc. will win the
students’ interest at this stage and will deepen their
knowledge and comprehension of the medium.
In the highest and last phase there is emphasis on the
reasoned judgement of the aesthetic aspects of the work of art,
while being aware of the subjectivity of the judgement. In
this stage Slow Motion will be examined in relation to its
repetitive usages for expressing over simplified peak emotional
moments and its manipulative aspects. This usage will be compared
to other complex alternatives the device enables. Thus, for
instance, in “Zero de conduit (Jean Vigo, 1933) a
surprising backward somersault of one of the pupils in the film
is documented in Slow Motion. It is a metaphor, which expresses
the youth’s aspiration for freedom. The so called exit from
the framework of objective time (Slow Motion) in order to
document a sudden and exceptional movement of a back somersault,
gives it the quality of a strange hovering in space. Therefore,
it is a most powerful expression of the desire for the release
from the limits of time and space, meaning the desire for
freedom. The intensity of expression stems therefore from the use
of Slow Motion.
The Uniqueness and
the Contribution of the Cognitive Approach to the
Comprehension of the Art of Cinema
The
developmental–cognitive approach for the comprehension of
cinema sets a challenge to widespread approaches to the medium.
The Marxist approach for instance, sees in cinematic creation
mainly the symptomatic representation of extra-cinematic social
phenomena, while the psychoanalytical approach sees in it mainly
a psychological expression that is unconscious to the creator and
the perceiver. Both tend to often ignore the autonomy of the
unique aesthetic dimension of the cinematic work of art or view
this dimension as site of ideological resistance (Marxism) or as
the key to decipher slips of the unconscious within the film. In
contrast to them, the cognitive approach grasps the cinematic
work of art as a conscious activity of creation and reception.
Its essence is the conscious processing of unique devices in
order to embody representation, emotion and significance so that
they are actively cognized in the work of art by the
viewer.
Based on its
understanding of the cinematic viewer as active and conscious
during the process of cognition vis-a-vis the film, the cognitive
approach rejects the dominant trend in the NeoMarxist
psychoanalytical approach which believes in the unprecedented
ideological power of the medium20. According to this approach cinema has a
tremendous influence on its viewers, due to their uncontrolled
trust in the mechanic and precise documentation of reality. In
contrast to it, Cognitivism sees in the medium's documentation
ability a possibility for the creation of unique realistic
aesthetics, which is only one of many aesthetic options available
to cinema. Andre Bazin, for example, developed a realistic
cinematic theory which is based on deep focused, long and
distanced shots, which enable, among other thing, the symbolic
embodiment of continuous time and three dimensional space21. However,
this cinematic aesthetics does not exhaust the variety of
cinematic styles.
Likewise, the cognitive
approach rejects seeing cinema as expressing phenomena belonging
to the hidden soul of the creator or as having direct influence
on the viewer’s hidden soul. This widespread approach
assumes that the art of cinema neutralizes the conscious mental
activity in favor of unconscious emotional manipulation22. While
traditional cognitivists, in a somewhat reactionary manner,
rejected serious attempts at coming to terms with emotions, thus
alowing the untempered difussion of psychoanalytic explanations
of emotional cinematic impact, recent cognitivist theories offer
a view whereby emotion and thought do not contradict but
synergetically generate one another. Hence Noel Carrol has
recently developed a cognitivist theory of art emotion based on
the idea that while all emotional responses appear to be similar
in their physiological dynamics and manifestations, what
differentiates emotions from one another and even generates them
are the contents of thoughts entertained23. As philosopher Israel
Shefler said, “an emotion without consciousness is blind,
and consciousness without emotion is empty”24. I think this
should be the guideline for cognitive approaches to the question
of emotions. Indeed, symbolic representations in art do not only
represent something in the world or convey significance but also
express emotions. However, what is the meaning of
“expression of emotions”? It does not mean that the
work of art embodies in itself in some mysterious way the
emotional mood, in which the creator was in while creating the
work of art, or that this mood affects therefore, and
respectively, the perceiver of the work of art. On the contrary,
it means that the creator, who is responsible for embodying
mental representations by means of symbols, knows how to express
emotion in a work of art whether he feels it at the time of its
performance or not. In the same way the perceiver of the work of
art can comprehend an expression of emotion whether he feels it
or not while perceiving the work of art. In other words, emotion
is not a condition for the comprehensive perception of a work of
art. In contrast to that, an active and aware recognition of the
embodiment of emotion in a work of art is a necessary condition
for its comprehensive perception.
An interesting
illustration of an aesthetic processing of this kind can be found
in the surrealist film An Andalusian Dog (Bunuel and Dali,
1929). While watching the film the viewer is requested to try and
comprehend the embodiment of desires and emotions within the
somnambulist logic of dreams. Thus, in the opening scene of the
film, in which a character's eye is split open by a razor blade,
the emotionally appalling image is accompanied by a cold image of
the moon being “cut” by a cloud. The compositional
analogy between the cutting of the eye and the
“cutting” of the moon creates a riddle for the
viewer, and thus addresses him to the associative logic of the
dream while simultaneously embodying a potential emotional shock
for the viewer.
The cognitive approach
rejects also rationalistic approaches to the art of cinema such
as semiotic or structural approaches which aspire to reveal the
exact mechanism of the cinematic "language system” or of
its "structure" respectively25. Such an attempt tends to neutralize the
aesthetic dimension in the cinematic work of art in favor of
locating an accurate mechanism for creating significance, which
can be presumably reproduced any time. In these approaches there
is an attempt to lay a set of rules operating in a certain
consistency and creating a fixed significance. They do not have a
clear distinction between a work of art and a practical or
scientific expression. Contrary to them, the cognitive approach
sees in the artistic work a compositional process which loads its
elements with the particular significance stemming from a given
context and embodied only in it. Thus this approach preserves the
aesthetic dimension.
The Implications of
the Developmental-Cognitive Approach on Teaching
Cinema
Discussions on cinema
focusing on the right and the good (Marxism), on the abyss of the
soul (psychoanalysis) or on exposing the accurate mechanism of
the cinematic language (semiotics, structuralism) emerge from an
extra-aesthetic point of view.
These discussions have
brought about the focus on these emphases in the education for
watching and for making films. Thus, for instance, it is a common
idea among film educators that the efficiency of such teaching is
in providing the pupils with the tools to cope with the
ideological manipulations of the medium through learning
cinematic “language”. Others claim that teaching film
enables the students to open up and to talk about issues
bothering them in their adolescence or that films can serve as
effective illustrations for learning other, more important
subjects. Accordingly, in teaching cinematic skills common ideas
include the efficiency of teaching film for enhancing cooperation
among pupils due to the collaborative nature of film production
and the contribution of film classes to the social involvement of
its participants. Also, film skill teaching is viewed as venue
for the personal expression of students who usually do not feel
comfortable in other frameworks, or as efficient in inserting a
sense of discipline, order and organization, inherent in the
production of films.
Without underestimating
these values, there is a feeling that the carriage was placed
before the horses. It seems that the aesthetic aspect of cinema
is not the most important focus when conducting such classes. It
must be the other way around: to start with what distinguishes
the art of cinema, which means focusing upon aesthetic issues,
and from there, if desired, to deal with extra-aesthetic
issues.
This concept is not
innovative. Actually it has a long tradition, though not
successive, in the history of thoughts about cinema. Already at
the beginning of the 20th century the Russian
formalists have raised similar claims. For them the discussion of
extra-aesthetic aspects is secondary and even defected if one
does not start from what is immanent to the art. The search for
artistic immanence in cinema led them to see in photogenicity and
montage26 the two central processes forging the
aestethization of cinematographed “raw” material. The
essence of this process consisted for them in disjointing the raw
cinematographed material away from its presumed natural
surroundings and significance and weave it into an artistic
context and significance, achieved by the mutual compositional
interrelation of the cinematographed materials through a
consistent style or formal infrastructure. The psychologist of
the Gestalt school of thought and the aesthete Rudolf Arnheim
followed this line of thought in his cinematic theory. Focusing
upon the gap between the documented reality and its cinematic
embodiment he strove to delineate a unique cinematic aesthetics27.
Today we find a revival
of the aesthetic perspective among cognitive theorists of cinema.
It is evidenced in Bordwell's and Brannigan's writings on
cinematic narrative devices and cinematic schemes28, in
Carroll’s writings about emotions as being led by thought
in "art horror" films29, and in the writings of Salomon on the unique
cognitive kinetic and spatial intelligence needed for the
aesthetic processing of cinema30. They and other theorists writing on
cinema from a cognitive perspective have established a new
paradigm for an aesthetic cognitive discussion of the art of
cinema. The advantage of this approach and the related
cognitive-developmental approach outlined in this article is that
it offers a gradual educational progression towards the aesthetic
comprehension of cinema. This is based on the assumption that
cinematic aesthetic cognition and sensibility can be fostered and
that pupils as well as people of all ages have an innate
aesthetic interest and the desire to comprehend art.
This short outline of
the developmental–cognitive approach for the comprehension
of cinema is intended to promote its use in research and in the
education for watching and making films and other audio-visual
moving images. The assumption that it is possible to foster
cinematic artistic cognition, as it is possible to foster other
cognitive abilities, leads to the conclusion that there is no
reason to prevent ourselves and our students from developing an
aesthetic sensitivity for such a dominant artistic
medium.
I suggest basing the
syllabus of cinema studies on the developmental cognitive
perspective outlined above. Such program will place the aesthetic
perspective at the heart of cinema education. Progression will be
according to the aesthetic emphases mentioned (an emphasis on the
adequacy of representation, an emphasis on emotional
expressiveness in cinema, an emphasis on cinematic mediumal
aspects and an emphasis on complex self aware aesthetic
judgement). This gradual structure meets the need to adjust the
discussion of the aesthetics of cinema for the various ages or
stages of education, and offers the schools a framework for a
continuous syllabus on the subject.31
Notes
1 Other
cinematic theoretical approaches do not seriously address
fostering processess. The semiotic approach for example concerns
itself with how film is a semiotic system but has no clear notion
of how this system is “learned” by viewers.When
cinematic theories inadvertently address fostering processess
they usually imply a vaguely elaborated notion of ideological
fostering rather than aesthetic fostering. The Marxist approach
for example implies ideological fostering through repetitive
manipulation of vaguely defined unconscious processess (e.g.,
Dayan, 1976) or to the evocation of social awareness by an
undefined idea of the training of consciousness through
deconstruction of ideological manipulation in
“dialectical” manner (e.g., Benjamin, 1969). There
isn’t a single approach to cinema I am aware of that
considers the process whereby aesthetic fostering
occurs.
2 Gardner
(1987); For a comprehensive survey of “The cognitive
revolution” and its relation to film theory see: Bordwell
(1989. pp. 11-40)
4Piaget &
Inhelder (1969, p. 98). It should be pointed out that the
schematic developmental theory outlined is much more complex and
object of much controversy nowadays. One interesting bottom up
claim is that the automaticity of some formal activities inheres
in motor-sensory perceptions, apparently implying a reversal of
the initial taxonomy (e.g., Hochberg, 1989). It seems however
that while it is plausible that action on objects is always led
by automatic inborn as well as consequently acquired formal
activities, what is of importance in the process outlined is not
whether action is led by formal activities or not but the
difference between nonconscious automatic formal activities and
top down consciously managed formal activities. In this respect
formal automaticity does not seem to imply reversal of the
process.
6Goodman (1976);
Gardner (1990); Gombrich (1960)
8Gardner and
Winner (1982)
9Gardner (1990);
Parsons (1987); Housan (1987).
11
Parson's attribution of stages to age has no grounding, except
for its correlation with Piaget's general cognitive developmental
stages. However, Parsons himself admits that latter stages are
ageless. I find that the cognitive development of art
comprehension as of any other specific cognitive activity can be
disjointed from age and be applied as successive development to
people of any age.
14e.g., See
Christian Metz's "syntagms" (Metz, 1974)
15e.g., See
Tynianov on Close Up (Tynianov, 1981)
16E.g.,
Mother V. Pudovkin, 1926.
17E.g., Joan
of Arc, C. Th. Dreyer, 1928
18E.g.,
Silence of the Lambs, J. Demmi, 1991.
20What has come
to be termed the Althusserian-Lacanian paradigm. See for example
Baudry (1985).
21Bazin (1967).
Bazin’s aesthetics has been taken as paradigmatic of the
ideological manipulation film excercises upon its viewers. This
prevalent view among Marxist analyses does not consider the
simple notion that his aesthetics is neither transparent in films
nor inclusive of other aesthetic formations of films.
24Quoted in
Gardner (1992, p. 97). See also Scheffler (1960)
25Metz (1974),
Wright (1975). It should be pointed out however that contemporary
semioticians have been driven to incorporate into their rational
systemic analyses of texts the psychoanalytic notion that
language and art are desire driven and should better be
approached as a process whose traces are evident in the text,
subverting its systemic manifestations. This approach, most
eloquently formulated by Kristeva (1980), reverts nevertheless to
the psychoanalytic framework criticized above.
28Brannigan
(1992); Bordwell (1985)
31 Hence the history of
film might be approached in such manner that correlates the
gradual progression of film history with the progression of
aesthetic fostering. While adequacy of representation was a major
concern of early filmmaking (in Lumiere but also in Vertov and
Epstein) emotional expressiveness was a major concern of German
Expresssionism. American genres and self reflexive counter films
are highly concerned with mediumal aspects, whereas contemporary
postmodern cinema requires of its viewers a wide knowledge of the
medium’s history and a critical approach.
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About the
Author
Nitzan Ben-Shaul, Ph.D.
2 Ha'Congress St.
Herzlia
Pituach, Israel 46753
Tel: 09-9547626; Cellphone: 054-924334
E-mail: benshaul@post.tau.ac.il
Film and Television Department
Faculty of
Arts
Tel-Aviv
University
Tel-Aviv
69978, Israel
MA (1986); PhD (1993) from New York University, Cinema Studies Department.
Acting Chair and lecturer on Film Theory and Israeli Film, the Film and
Television Department, Tel Aviv University. Author of Mythical
Expressions
of Siege in Israeli Films (The Edwin Mellen Press, 1997) and
Introduction
to
Film Theories (Dyonon, 2000). Published articles on film and television
theory (e.g., Third Text) and on Israeli Films (e.g., Zmanim).
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